Why students are treated worse than customers by Macfarlane, Bruce
                          Macfarlane, B. (2016). Why students are treated worse than customers.
University World News.
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
This is the author accepted manuscript (AAM). The final published version (version of record) is available online
via University World News at https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20160517150918945.
Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher.
University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published
version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available:
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/about/ebr-terms
  1 
Why students are treated worse than customers 
 
Bruce Macfarlane 
University of Southampton, UK 
 
What do graduates owe to society, if anything, in the context of the marketisation of 
higher education? I believe that the only logical response to this question is that they 
owe society very little. The triumph of market-based arguments concerning who 
should pay for higher education, particularly in an English context, means that 
university students (and their parents) have been converted from social free-riders, to 
use the language of Friedmanite neo-liberalism, into customers benefiting from higher 
education as a positional good in providing a private, life-time benefit. If students do 
not have a right to a higher education how can they have an obligation to wider 
society? We cannot have it both ways. The question is not whether students are 
customers. It is patently clear, and has been for quite some time, that this is exactly 
what they are.  
 
I am interested in why student academic freedom and student rights as learners are 
being undermined in contemporary higher education. Or, to put my concerns in the 
shape of a rhetorical question: ‘Why are students treated worse than customers?’ 
University students have become the target of a performative culture, one which 
previously has only really been associated with characterizing the way in which 
professionals – such as university lecturers – find their behaviour and attitudes 
(re)directed by audits, targets, incentives and controls demonstrating a fundamental 
loss of trust in their professionalism. University students are similarly afflicted by 
performativity in higher education. Students, in short, are no longer trusted to learn 
without being seen to be learning. This is the assumption that underpins the ‘student 
engagement’ movement. 
 
There are many examples of what I call student performativity – the widespread use 
of attendance registers formerly associated with school level learning rather than 
university; the growing reliance on class contribution grading that superficially 
assesses vocal loquacity; the assessment of group work with all its blatant unfairness; 
the use of technology to purportedly measure levels of student ‘engagement’; and the 
ubiquitous use of Turnitin, yet another indicator of the way in which students are no 
longer trusted. Aside from bodily and participative performativity assessment regimes 
are putting increasing emphasis on emotional performativity demanding reflective 
confessionals from students about how their learning has been shaped or 
‘transformed’ by personal or professional experiences. To satisfy these demands 
students must make personal self-disclosures or simulate one in an inauthentic display 
of expressive individualism.  
 
The key thing about performativity is that it distorts behaviour. Compulsory 
attendance rules encourage presenteeism as opposed to a desire to learn, class 
contribution grading rewards speaking at the expense of thinking or other deeper 
forms of engagement, whilst reflective exercises attempt to audit moral virtue rather 
than intellectual development. These examples place an emphasis on the visible and 
the measurable rather than real learning which is a lot harder to observe or judge. The 
civic dimension of higher education is meant to be about doing good but is being 
converted into a form of self-commodification placing a further performative demand 
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on students. They are encouraged to use community volunteering and gap-year 
tourism to puff up their CVs. Even being a student rep is promoted by student unions 
as a means of developing a useful set of work-related skills.  
 
The demands of performativity violate a student’s right to learn when, where and how 
they prefer. Student rights are not just about political protest and free speech. They 
are also about the right to reticence when they might prefer not to speak in class, the 
right to privacy with respect to their personal values and beliefs, the right to choose 
how to learn and to be treated as an adult undertaking a voluntary activity. Despite the 
rhetoric of student-centred what we have is the exact opposite of what Carl Rogers 
intended (Rogers, 1969).  
 
Rights in education, particularly in relation to university education, are normally 
thought of in two ways. Firstly, there is the right to an education something enshrined 
in article 26 of the UN Declaration of Human Rights (1948) in respect to elementary 
education. This does not mean that everyone enjoys a right to a university education 
although some countries, such as France, do give all students who have passed their 
baccalaureate a right to enter their local university. The debate about tuition fees and 
student protests in England, Germany, Quebec, South Korea and elsewhere globally 
show how much we focus on this idea of rights in higher education. 
 
There is also a lot of attention given to rights through education. This is about the 
rights of students to receive a good quality university experience that also provides 
appropriate employment opportunities. Again, considerable debate, discussion and 
research surrounds this issue. However, I believe that we need to pay much more 
attention to rights within higher education. This refers to the way in which we treat 
students as learners. The argument I am making in this contribution is that a fair or 
just student learning environment is every bit if not more important than an effective 
one judged in terms of so-called ‘learning gain’.  
 
As Tristan McCowan has pointed out if we classify something as a right it cannot be 
‘conditional on any use that it is subsequently put to’ (McCowan, 2013:134). Nor is a 
right the same as an obligation (McCowan, 2013:135). We do not currently treat a 
higher education as a right but as a private positional good. Even if we treated higher 
education as a right it would not necessarily follow that university students have 
particular obligations to civic society.  
 
This all means that we have the bizarre situation where we are treating students as 
customers and at the same time becoming increasingly authoritarian about how they 
can learn at university. The illogicality of this is a bit like expecting someone to pay a 
high membership fee to join a private gym and then reproaching them for not doing 
enough exercise or putting on weight. Students are customers, made so by the 
widespread acceptance of the Friedmanite logic of labeling higher education a private 
good. Yet, if they are customers they should enjoy the right to engage with higher 
education in the ways in which they choose.  
 
A ‘performative customer’ is a paradox, perhaps even an oxymoron. University 
students in England are customers but, at the same time, it needs to be remembered 
that they are also undertaking a voluntary activity in a non-compulsory phase of the 
education and are legally defined as adults. Currently they are being treated worse 
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than a customer since they are required to incur a substantial deferred debt in order to 
experience a university education at the same time as being subjected to an 
authoritarian regime of surveillance and control in the way they learn. 
 
Note 
 
This contribution is based on my forthcoming book: 
 
Macfarlane, B. (2016) Freedom to Learn: the threat to student academic freedom and 
why it needs to be reclaimed, Routledge, New York & Abingdon. 
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